Q1).Smith, Michael "Realism" (Chapter 9). Ethical Theory: AnAnthology. Ed. Russ Landau. 2nd ed. Chichester, West Sussex:Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Print.
Q2.The author claims that moral realism in the rational view that thereexist moral facts. That in every action a human does there is abelief to explain how things are, and a desire to explain how thingought to be. Since for us to make sense of the universe there need tobe some facts that are in line with our desires.
Q3.(Smith 65) The author suggests that in order for a judgment of rightor wrong to our reasons for an action to be made facts are required.However, our desires motivate our reasons. As a result, for ourbeliefs about our reasons to have motivational implications they mustcollaret with our desires. In this, judgment of right and wrongexpresses our beliefs about our reason. In addition, these facts weconsider are those that we would desire when we are in an idealcondition that is when we are calm, cool, well-informed andcollected. This is convincing since outlines the relationship betweenour desires, reasons, and beliefs to the facts we use for judgment ofright and wrong.
Q4a).(Smith 66) The author says that a judgment about an agent’s reasonmust have motivation implication, in which the rational agent ismotivated accordingly and also this judgment is an expression ofbelief. Where by belief is an object of desire. However, there arethose individuals that don’t have a desire to do what they desire.In this then it is unclear why some people do or don’t things ifthey do not act according to their desires.
Q4b).With our world, today, and all its different people with allot ofdiversity can there be a singular moral convergence accepted in allthis diversity?
Q5).The standard picture of human psychology now returns to center-stage.For it tells us that there is always the possibility of somenon-rationally- explicable difference in our desires even under suchidealized conditions of reflection (Smith 66).
Thisis meaningful since it outlines that even in same circumstances wecan always do different things. Additionally, that is why differentpeople although in the same circumstance do different things andbecome different from each other.
Q6a).Is it true that there are some non-rationally- explicable differencein our desires even in the idealize conditions?
Q6b).Yes, there are.
Shafer-Landau,Russ. EthicalTheory: An Anthology.Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Print.